Eastern Air Lines 401(Eastern Air Lines), Lockheed L-1011 , Miami International Airport , December 29, 1972

By way of background, the Eastern Air Lines flight originated from New York. On board are 10 crewmembers and 162 passengers.  It is proverbial dark night when the Lockheed crew approach Miami.  The Everglades, which stretch east of Miami Airport, are essentially uninhabited and there now ground references there at night—i.e., ground lights.  Again, dialogue is reconstructed using the Lockheed’s Cockpit Voice Recorder and recorded radio transmissions.1

Crew

  • Captain Robert (Bob) Loft—30,000 hours flying experience.
  • First Officer Albert (Bert) Stockstill—total time unknown, but 300 hours on the L-1011.
  • Second Officer Don Repo—time unknown.2

 

ATC

Air Traffic Controller

C

Captain

FO

First Officer

SO

Second Officer

TO

Easter Air Lines Technical Officer (jumpseat)

 

C:

(over PA system): Welcome to Miami.  The temperature is in the low seventies, and it’s a beautiful night out there tonight.

ATC:

(Clears Eastern 401 to join the ILS3 for Runway 09L, and advises the crew to contact the tower.)

C:

(to ATC): Cleared to ILS 09 left, call Miami Tower on 118.3.  Eastern 401, so long.

C:

(to ATC): Miami Tower, Eastern 401—just turned on to final.

ATC:

(no response)

C:

(to First Officer): Go ahead and throw them (the gear) out.

FO:

(complies)

C:

Miami Tower—do you read Eastern 401?  Just turned on to final.

ATC:

Eastern 401, heavy—continue approach to 09 Left.

C:

Continue approach—roger.

C:

(noting that only two of three green gear lights are on, to FO): Bert, is that (undercarriage) handle in.

FO:

No nose gear.

(Crew recycles gear; indications remain unchanged)

C:

(to ATC): Well.  Tower, this is Eastern 401.  It looks like we’re going to have to circle—we don’t have a light on our nose gear.4

ATC:

Eastern 401 heavy, roger.  Climb straight ahead to 2000—go back to Approach Control on 128.6

C:

Okay, going up to 2000—128.6

FO:

(reaches for gear lever)

C:

Put power on first, Bert—leave that damn gear down until we’ve found out what we’ve got.

SO:

(to Captain): Do you want to test the lights.

C:

Yeah—check it.

FO:

Bob, it might just be the light (itself).  Could you juggle it?

FO:

We’re up to 2000—you want me to fly it, Bob?5

C:

What frequency did they want us on, Bert?

FO:

128.6

C:

I’ll talk to them.

SO:

It’s right above . . that red one, isn’t it?

C:

Yeah—I can’t get at it from here.

SO:

I can’t make it pull out either.

C:

(to ATC): Approach Control—Eastern 401.  We’re right over the airport now, climbing to 2000 feet—in fact we’ve reached 2000—and we’ve got to get a green light on our nose gear.

ATC:

Eastern 401, roger.  Turn left, heading 360, maintain 2000—vectors to 09 Left on final.

C:

Left—360.

C:

Put the damn thing on autopilot.  See if you can get it out.6

FO:

(complies)

C:

(to the First Officer): Now push the switches just a little bit forward—you’ve got to turn it sideways.

FO:

No, I don’t think it’ll fit.

C:

You’ve got to turn it a quarter-turn to the left.

ATC:

Eastern 401, turn left—heading 300.

(Captain acknowledges; First officer complies.)

C:

(frustrated, to Second Officer): Hey—get down there and see if that damn nose wheel is down—you better do that.7

FO:

(continuing at removing the light): Got a handkerchief or something so I can get a better grip?  Anything I can do it with?

TO:

(to the First Officer): . . pull down and turn to the right.  Now turn it to your left one time.

FO:

It hangs out and sticks.

TO:

Try it my way.

FO:

(to Captain): It won’t come out, Bob—if I had a pair of pliers, I could cushion it with that Kleenex.

SO:

(about to climb down into the electronics bay): I can give you a pair of pliers.  But if you force it, you’ll break it—believe me.

ATC:

Eastern 401, turn left—heading 270.

(Captain acknowledges; First officer complies.)

C:

To hell with it!  To hell with this—(to the Second Officer): go down and see if it’s lined up on that red line—that’s all we care!  (Laughs)  Screwing around with a 20-cent piece of light equipment—on this plane.

(Others laugh too.)

C:

(to ATC): Eastern 401 will go out west a little further if we can . . see if we can’t get this light to come on.

ATC:

All right.  We’ve got you heading westbound now, Eastern 401.

(Captain and First Officer continue to manipulate the light assembly for an additional two minutes or so.)

FO:

Always something.  We could have made it on schedule.

(The Cockpit Voice Recorder records a C-chord chime at the Second Officer’s panel.  The Second Officer is not at his station.)

C:

(to First Officer): Leave it there.

SO:

(returning): I can’t see it down there.

C:

For the nose wheel there’s a place in there where you can look and see if it’s lined up.

SO:

I know—a little like a telescope.

C:

It’s not lined up?

SO:

I can’t see it.  It’s pitch dark

TO:

Wheel well light on?

SO:

Yeah.  Wheel well lights are always on if the gear’s down.

(Second Officer and Technical Officer descend into electronics bay.)

ATC:

(Controller reads encoded altitude of 900’.)  Eastern 401—how are things coming along out there?

C:

Okay—we’d like to turn around now and come back in.

FO:

(Observes airspeed increased from 174 to 188 KTS, and responds by retarding the thrust levers slightly)

ATC:

Eastern 401—turn left, heading 180.

Captain acknowledge and the First officer complies. 

FO:

(noting the altitude): We did something to the altitude!

C:

What?

FO:

Were still at 2000—right?

C:

Hey—what’s happening here!

(Controller notes Eastern 401 has disappeared from radar.)

ATC:

Eastern 401, I’ve lost you on radar—and your transponder.  What is your altitude?

Pilot:

Miami Approach, this is National 611.  We just saw a big flash—looked like it was out west.  Don’t know what it means, but we wanted to let you know.

Pilot:

(This is) Lan Chile 451—we saw a big flash—a general flash, like some kind of explosion.

 

Post Accident Findings :

  • The first record of inadvertent vertical descent—when the Flight Data Recorder shows a momentary negative vertical acceleration, producing a 200’ per second descent for half a minute—is believed to be the result of the Captain inadvertently exerting force on the control wheel as he turn to speak to the Second Officer.  This likely disconnected the Altitude Hold function of the autopilot.  It is believed that improper wiring of the autopilot indicator lights resulted in the First Officer’s “ALT” (indicating altitude hold function) stayed on, despite the function being inadvertently turned off.8
  • It is believed that the C-chord chime that sounded at the Second Officer’s panel (while the Second Officer was in the electronics bay) was in fact the altitude alert system indicating that the aircraft had deviated 250’ from the pre-selected altitude.  The chime was not heard by the crews.
  • The Controller reported that he had noticed the encoder readout for Eastern 401 indicated 900’ only 36 seconds prior to impact.  The controller reported that he wanted to see one more radar sweep to verify the deviation in Eastern 401’s altitude, but before this could be done, the controller had to respond to other air traffic.
  • It is believed that the First Officer’s response to increased airspeed indications—from 174 to 188 KTS—was a misinterpretation of the aircraft’s acceleration from descent—the First Officer interpreted this as acceleration in level flight.

 

References

1 Macarthur Job, Air Disaster (Ibid) (see pp. 98-111 of Vol. 1).

2 The Second Officer is the third pilot in the cockpit—a position that has been phased out of newer transport aircraft.  The Second Officer’s job was supportive to the Captain and First Officer and included responsibility for monitoring aircraft systems.

3 “ILS” stands for “instrument landing system”, and this is a radio navigation system, displayed in the cockpit, that guides the pilot on final approach for landing.

4 On aircraft with retractable gear, there is display lighting in the cockpit which indicates a green light when the gear is locked in the landing position.  One of the lights is not indicating.

5 Note the Captain does not respond to the First Officer’s question.

6 Neither the Captain nor the Second Officer can reach the gear indication lights that are on the First Officer’s side of the cockpit.

7 The Flight Data Recorder shows a momentary negative vertical acceleration, which produces a 200’ per minute descent for half a minute.  It is believed that the Captain inadvertently disengaged the autopilot, which is designed to cut off if a pressure is exerted on the control wheel.

8 Post accident investigation found the two computers controlling the autopilot were mismatched with respect to pitch, leading to the misleading altitude hold indications on the FO’s panel.